Thomas Kuhn

Thomas Kuhn
	Thomas Kuhn, American philosopher of science
Tradition	Philosophy of science, History of science
Influenced by	Alexandre Koyré, Ludwik Fleck, Norwood Russell Hanson
Lifespan	1922–1996
Notable ideas	Paradigm shift; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions; concept of normal science vs. revolutionary science; incommensurability of paradigms
Occupation	Philosopher, Historian of science
Influenced	Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Bruno Latour, Science and Technology Studies
Wikidata	Q184980

Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922–1996) was a historian and philosopher of science whose ideas transformed how scholars understand scientific progress. His 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions introduced the famous concepts of paradigm and paradigm shift, arguing that science does not advance by a simple linear accumulation of facts but by periodic revolutions. Kuhn showed that periods of steady “normal science,” in which researchers solve puzzles within an established framework, are punctuated by crises and revolutions that replace one framework with another. These ideas challenged earlier views of science as always objectively cumulative and influenced fields far beyond philosophy and history of science.

Kuhn’s work stressed the social and historical context of science. He argued that scientists work largely within dominant theoretical frameworks (“paradigms”), which shape what questions are asked and what counts as a solution. When enough anomalies arise—data the current framework cannot explain—a scientific revolution may occur, leading to a new paradigm. Incommensurability, another of Kuhn’s key terms, pointed to the difficulty of fully translating concepts across paradigms. Together, these concepts prompted a broad reconsideration of how scientific knowledge evolves.

This article outlines Kuhn’s life and career, summarizes his major works and ideas, and discusses how later philosophers responded. It covers Kuhn’s model of scientific change, his influence on the history and sociology of science, criticisms of his views, and his lasting legacy. Technical terms are briefly defined when first introduced. While Kuhn’s thesis sparked controversy, it remains central to discussions of scientific change.

Early Life and Education

Thomas Kuhn was born on July 18, 1922, in Cincinnati, Ohio. His family valued education and progressive ideas. When Kuhn was a child, his parents moved to New York, where he attended the Lincoln School, a progressive elementary school. An anecdote Kuhn later recalled was that by second grade he was reading poorly, but the school encouraged critical thinking rather than rote learning. In 1929 the family settled in Croton-on-Hudson, a suburb of New York City, where Kuhn finished his secondary education.

In 1940 Kuhn entered Harvard College, following in the footsteps of his father and uncle. At Harvard he explored both the sciences and humanities. Although he briefly considered mathematics, he chose to major in physics due to its practical career paths. He graduated summa cum laude in 1943 with a Bachelor of Science in physics. During World War II, Kuhn worked in radar research at Harvard’s Radio Research Laboratory, which earned him a deferral from military service. Shortly after the war, in 1946, he earned a master’s degree in physics from Harvard.

Kuhn remained at Harvard for his doctorate. He originally pursued theoretical physics, completing a Ph.D. in 1949. His dissertation applied quantum mechanics to problems in solid-state physics. As a graduate student, however, Kuhn became intrigued by the history of science. He took philosophy courses and became involved with the newly founded Harvard Society of Fellows, an interdisciplinary group for promising young scholars. There, colleagues such as the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine influenced him. Kuhn’s teaching obligations included an experimental course using historical case studies to teach science to students in the humanities. Reading original works by Aristotle and others had a profound effect on him; Kuhn later noted how approaching old theories without knowledge of later developments forced him to understand historical scientists on their own terms. This experience cemented his interest in the history and philosophy of science.

Academic Career and Early Works

After completing his Ph.D., Kuhn was appointed a junior fellow in the Harvard Society of Fellows (around 1949). In the early 1950s he began teaching at Harvard, first as an instructor and then as an assistant professor in the general education curriculum and history of science. Alongside his teaching, Kuhn worked on historical studies of science. His early research focused on eighteenth-century matter theory and the early development of thermodynamics.

In 1951 Kuhn delivered a series of invited talks at the Lowell Institute (Lowell Lectures). These lectures marked the start of his written contributions to the history of science. That period of exploration led to his first book, The Copernican Revolution (published 1957). In this work Kuhn examined how the shift from the geocentric (Earth-centered) to heliocentric (sun-centered) model of the solar system unfolded during the Renaissance. He explored not just the astronomy but how the new theory spread through the scientific community. Kuhn’s analysis highlighted that the Copernican shift was not a smooth, immediate triumph but involved decades of debate, corrections, and gradual acceptance.

Despite its historical focus, The Copernican Revolution already hinted at Kuhn’s broader ideas. He showed that changing the core astronomical framework required rethinking basic assumptions (for example, the nature of planets’ orbits). This set the stage for his mature work. Kuhn’s historical studies were rigorous but also accessible, leading Harvard at one point to deny him tenure because the committee considered the book too popular in style. However, comparisons with fellow scholars showed that Kuhn’s work reached a wide intellectual audience. A friend of Kuhn helped him move to the University of California, Berkeley, in 1956, where he became an associate professor in the history of science (and later in the philosophy department).

At Berkeley (1956–1964), Kuhn expanded his scholarship and began writing the book that would make him famous. He collaborated with philosophers and historians such as Stanley Cavell (who introduced him to Wittgenstein’s ideas) and Paul Feyerabend (who became a lifelong friend and interlocutor). Feyerabend in particular discussed drafts of what became The Structure of Scientific Revolutions with Kuhn. By combining rigorous historical research (like in his work on early astronomy) with philosophical reflection, Kuhn was crafting a new approach: one that treated science as a socially embedded practice.

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

In 1962 Thomas Kuhn published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, usually abbreviated SSR. This book remains his best-known work and is regarded as one of the most influential philosophy-of-science books of the 20th century. In it Kuhn challenged the prevailing image of science as a steady, linear march toward truth. Instead, he proposed a model of alternating phases: long periods of normal science, punctuated by short-lived scientific revolutions.

Normal Science and Paradigms

According to Kuhn, “normal science” is the routine work scientists do when they accept a common paradigm. A paradigm (a word Kuhn used in several ways) can be understood as the dominant set of theories, methods, and standards in a scientific community. It includes not just abstract laws but also the specific examples, instruments, and problem-solving techniques that scientists learn and use. For example, in late 19th-century physics, the paradigm included Newton’s laws, Maxwell’s equations for electromagnetism, and the laboratory techniques of the time.

During normal science, researchers assume the paradigm is essentially correct. They engage in “puzzle-solving”: they work on questions that the paradigm identifies, expecting solutions will fit the framework. These puzzles might involve explaining a new experimental result, refining a calculation, or extending a theory’s precise scope. Because the paradigm provides strong tools and expectations, most of these puzzles are predictable and solvable with existing knowledge. Kuhn emphasized that normal science is conservative and detail-oriented: its goal is to articulate and expand the paradigm, not to overthrow it. Galileo’s famous telescopic observations, for instance, fit into an existing mathematical model of motion and thus advanced normal science.

Anomalies and Crisis

Over time, however, repeated experiments or observations may produce anomalies—unexpected results that cannot be readily explained by the current paradigm. An anomaly is a puzzle that resists solution. Kuhn argued that normal science tends to ignore or downplay anomalies unless they become significant. Scientists often try to accommodate anomalies by adjusting theories or questioning the experiment. If an anomaly can be resolved (for example, by improving measurement or finding a subtle effect), normal science continues.

But if anomalies accumulate, they weaken confidence in the paradigm. Examples include the Michelson-Morley experiment in the 1880s, which failed to detect the proposed “luminiferous ether” that classical physics posited for light waves. In Kuhn’s view, a science enters a state of crisis when enough serious anomalies accumulate that the paradigm can no longer account for them convincingly. At that point, new ideas may begin to emerge.

Scientific Revolutions and Paradigm Shifts

A scientific revolution occurs when the existing paradigm is replaced by a new one. This happens when a new theory or model explains the anomalies better. For Kuhn, revolutionary change is not merely a natural extension of old ideas; it is a kind of intellectual rupture. During a revolution, normal rules of science break down. Scientists debate fundamental concepts, carry out new types of experiments, and eventually align around a new framework. An example that Kuhn and others noted is the shift from Isaac Newton’s mechanics to Albert Einstein’s relativity near the turn of the 20th century. Newton’s laws had been successful for centuries, but anomalies like the motion of Mercury’s perihelion and inconsistencies with electromagnetism led to Einstein’s theory, which redefined ideas of space and time.

Kuhn often described revolutions as paradigm shifts, a phrase which captures the sense that a whole conceptual world-view changes. When a new paradigm emerges, scientists see things differently. For example, under a geocentric (Earth-based) paradigm, planetary motion was explained using complex epicycles. Under the heliocentric paradigm of Copernicus and Kepler, planets were understood to orbit the sun in (approximately) elliptical paths. These two pictures involve different concepts and values: what counted as a good model or measurement changed. Because paradigms consist of broad world-views, there is often no neutral way to directly compare an old paradigm to a new one. In SSR, Kuhn coined the term incommensurability to express this difficulty. Incommensurability means theories may use different concepts or definitions so that comparing them in a strict, one-to-one way is impossible. For example, if the meaning of the word “mass” or “time” differs between two paradigms, then talking about “more truth” in one versus the other can be problematic.

Figure (conceptual): One could illustrate Kuhn’s model with a timeline graph of a science’s growth. The horizontal axis is time, and the vertical axis could represent “accepted science” or level of consensus. A long flat line (plateau) might represent a period of normal science with minor fluctuations. Then a sharp jump upward would indicate a revolution as a new paradigm is adopted. After the jump, the line flattens again under the new paradigm. This mimics Kuhn’s idea of science progressing in leaps rather than a straight line.

Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions includes several notable features. He pointed out that new paradigms often solve many of the old puzzles that created the crisis, but they may also raise new puzzles. The decision as to which paradigm is accepted is not purely logical; scientists often cite factors like explanatory power, simplicity, or community consensus. Because paradigms shape what counts as a legitimate problem and answer, a group of scientists under one paradigm may literally see different facts from those under another. Kuhn used examples like perspective drawings in art; a Renaissance figure cannot “see” perspective the way a modern viewer does without the conceptual background.

Perhaps the most famous example of a paradigm shift is the Copernican revolution: the change from the Ptolemaic Earth-centered astronomy to the heliocentric model. Kuhn analyzed this in his 1957 book. He and others have also noted the Chemical Revolution of the late 18th century, when Antoine Lavoisier replaced the phlogiston theory of combustion with modern chemistry. In the 19th century, the acceptance of plate tectonics in geology is sometimes cited as another paradigm shift. In more recent times, some have argued that the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s or the discovery of DNA’s structure in biology were revolutions in Kuhn’s sense. Kuhn himself discussed revolutions mainly in the physical sciences, but his ideas have since been applied to many fields.

Paradigms Beyond Science

While Kuhn intended paradigm as a technical term for science, it quickly entered the general vocabulary. Today people speak of a “paradigm shift” in any field when a major change occurs. Often this usage stretches Kuhn’s meaning (for example, calling a new gadget a paradigm shift). Kuhn himself later expressed some dismay that the term had become a catchall phrase. Still, the core idea—that periods of consensus are interrupted by radical change—helped non-experts think differently about progress in technology, politics, business, and culture.

Other Major Works and Ideas

After The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn continued to explore the themes of his new approach, while clarifying and refining his views. He taught at leading universities (Harvard, Berkeley, Princeton, and MIT) and wrote additional books, essays, and lectures on history and philosophy of science.

One significant collection is The Essential Tension (1977), whose pieces were mostly written in the 1960s and 1970s. In it Kuhn introduced the phrase “the essential tension” to describe a balance in science between conservatism and innovation. He argued that scientific communities need both: the tradition of solving puzzles within a paradigm (which ensures stability and expertise) and the willingness to take unorthodox approaches (which leads to breakthroughs). Kuhn saw this tension as driving research creativity. He illustrated the point with examples: a young physicist may follow textbook methods (tradition) but also be brave enough to propose a new experiment (innovation). This idea acknowledges that even normal science involves some creativity, and also that challenge to orthodoxy often comes from within the community itself.

Kuhn also delved into more technical questions. He wrote about how metaphors play a role in science (“Metaphor in Science,” 1979) and about the relationship between the history of science and the philosophy of science (“Relations between the History and the Philosophy of Science,” 1977). Over the 1970s he gave lectures and papers debating issues like “rationality and theory choice,” often arguing that scientists’ choices of one theory over another cannot be reduced to simple rules. For Kuhn, comparing two rival theories involved weighing multiple factors (such as accuracy, scope, consistency, and simplicity), none dictated by logic alone.

In the late 1960s Kuhn revised Structure for a second edition (published 1970). He added a lengthy Postscript (1969) responding to critics and clarifying points. For example, he compared scientific revolutions to biological speciation, suggesting that new fields of research can branch off from the parent field even as the parent continues. In Postscript he also emphasized that once a new paradigm is established, its scientists see its successes as vindication of the shift. He gave further examples of paradigm shifts and noted that textbooks tend to sanitize scientific history, glossing over the very revolutions he described.

In his later years, Kuhn turned toward an evolutionary perspective on scientific change. He proposed that theory change could be thought of like natural selection. Communities of scientists “select” theories by testing them, and the best survive. He wrote a draft book titled Words and Worlds where he developed a comparative method for testing theories against each other (instead of looking for strict correspondence with reality). In this view, science is not necessarily moving toward an ultimate truth but evolving toward better problem-solving. Kuhn still maintained that paradigms shift and that new theories are better at solving anomalies; he simply argued that progress is more like populations diverging than like climbing a fixed ladder of reason. This was consistent with his earlier emphasis on the historically contingent way science develops.

Kuhn’s own style also evolved. Early on he admitted that he was uncomfortable with logical or formal analyses of discovery; he saw the process as partly psychological or sociological. In response to critics saying science was irrational under his model, he later argued that scientific judgment involves learned case-based reasoning (using exemplars) rather than explicit rules, much like how doctors diagnose by similarity to past cases. This refined view suggests that science is not lawless, but that its “rules” can change when the paradigm changes.

His final book, The Road Since Structure (2000), was published posthumously and collected essays from 1970–1993. In it, he reflected on critiques, answered questions about difficulty of communication between paradigms, and restated some of his views with even more emphasis on historical detail.

Influence and Reception

When The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first appeared, reaction was mixed but energetically debated. Within philosophy-of-science circles, many were skeptical. Kuhn’s account challenged the prevailing positivist model (associated with philosophers like Karl Popper and the logical empiricists), which held that science steadily accumulates knowledge through testing and falsification. Kuhn’s emphasis on incommensurability and community consensus sounded to some like an invitation to relativism or irrationalism. Early reviewers such as philosopher Dudley Shapere highlighted the “relativist” flavor of Kuhn’s claims; Popper himself considered Kuhn on the fringe of science history.

Among historians of science, Kuhn’s work had a dramatic effect. The 1960s saw what some call a historiographic revolution: historians began to study science as a social and developmental phenomenon. Kuhn was a major figure in this shift. Scholars took up his ideas about contextualizing discoveries, the role of textbooks in shaping narratives, and the need to understand scientists’ historical viewpoints. Kuhn’s historical cases (like the Copernican shift) became exemplars of a new method of writing science history.

Beyond academia, Kuhn’s ideas rapidly permeated other fields. In sociology and science studies, his concept of paradigms influenced the emerging field of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). Sociologists examined how scientific consensus forms and how non-empirical factors (like institutions and personalities) enter. Business and management thinkers began using “paradigm shift” to describe radical changes in technology or markets. The term even found its way into popular culture, with people talking about paradigm shifts in politics, education, or religion. (This broad usage often oversimplifies Kuhn’s intent, but it shows how catchy the concept became.)

In philosophy, later thinkers took positions influenced by Kuhn. Imre Lakatos attempted to synthesize Kuhn’s ideas with Popper’s in his theory of research programs (which admit “hard cores” of ideas that are defended against refutation). Paul Feyerabend, once Kuhn’s student, took Kuhnian insights further in Against Method (1975), arguing that science has no universal rules at all and championing a kind of epistemological anarchism. More mainstream philosophers like Larry Laudan and Philip Kitcher engaged with Kuhn’s theory by offering alternative models of theory change or progress. A specialist book series “Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge” (1970) documented some of these debates, featuring contributions by Kuhn and his pre- and post-Kuhn critics.

By the 1980s and 1990s, Kuhn was recognized as enormously important even by those who disagreed with him. For example, many accepted that science undergoes “revolutions” in some sense but argued that Kuhn overstated the discontinuity. Some historians argued that even paradigm shifts involve more continuity than Kuhn claimed. Others pointed out examples he had not emphasized, like the DNA discovery, which seemed revolutionary but did not follow Kuhn’s anomaly-led pattern.

Nevertheless, Kuhn’s influence on education and popular understanding has endured. Science textbooks often mention his name or use his terms. The idea that our world-views condition observations has entered mainstream discussions. In academia, research on scientific change still references Kuhn’s puzzles and anomalies, even if current accounts modify or reject parts of his account.

Critiques and Debates

Kuhn’s theory of scientific change has been both highly praised and sharply criticized. Scholars raised several main lines of critique:

Is the model historically accurate? Some historians of science argue that Kuhn’s model does not fit all cases. They point out that not every scientific field undergoes the neat cycles Kuhn described. For instance, analytic chemistry in the 19th century changed paradigms without a clear crisis or community debate, suggesting that revolutions can be subtler and scientists more adaptable than Kuhn assumed. Others noted that Kuhn’s own example, the Copernican Revolution, unfolded only gradually and long before the word “revolution” was used. In general, critics say Kuhn’s sharp distinctions (paradigm vs. tool-making) oversimplify complex episodes.

Frequency of change. Philosopher Stephen Toulmin and others argued that science is constantly changing, albeit in small ways, so the idea of long, tranquil normal phases is exaggerated. They claim Kuhn underestimates the steady evolution of theories during “normal” periods. In response, Kuhn might say those small changes do not count as shifts of the overarching paradigm.

Rationality and progress. Realist philosophers, defending the idea that science moves closer to truth, challenged Kuhn’s implication that one paradigm is not simply an approximation to a more accurate one. They argued that even if conceptual language differs, much scientific terminology (like basic quantities) refers to the same things in the world. For example, many scientists would say Einstein’s theory of gravitation is more “true” or at least more comprehensive than Newton’s, and the problem lies not in language but in Kuhn’s skepticism about a theory-independent reference. They maintained that theories can be compared on how well they correspond to reality (e.g. Einstein reduces to Newton’s laws at low speeds). Kuhn replied that “truth” can be a misleading term, as acceptance of a theory often has to do with different criteria of what problems matter.

Incommensurability. The core notion that competing paradigms are incommensurable was contested. Critics like Larry Laudan assumed that even if some terms change meaning, scientists usually build translation manuals between old and new frameworks. Later philosopher of language arguments (by Putnam and Kripke) suggested that theoretical terms could still refer to the same entities across theories, undermining the radical consequences of incommensurability. Kuhn eventually softened his original claim: he acknowledged that some incommensurability is semantic (words changing sense) rather than completely blocking communication. He distinguished methodological incommensurability (no shared methods or standards) from observational incommensurability (different experiences), and he downplayed the idea that paradigms are like different languages.

Psychology of scientists. Some alleged that Kuhn portrayed scientists as irrational or as following party-like factions, which many scientists and philosophers hated. Kuhn consistently insisted that science retains a strong measure of rational judgment; he argued that incommensurability does not mean anything goes, but it does mean criteria for theory choice are multifaceted. He even wrote papers (for instance "Reflections on My Critics," 1970) to show that scientific agreement (the “discipline” shared by a community) is not arbitrary but based on shared training, exemplars, and values.

Relativism accusations. Because Kuhn’s view implied that what counts as acceptable knowledge depends on the paradigm, some critics feared a slide into relativism: that truth is not absolute but a matter of consensus. Kuhn himself denied this extreme. He maintained that scientists genuinely believe they are finding truth, and communal agreement in science leads to stable knowledge (though not infallible). He clarified that incommensurability means you cannot simply say one theory is “truer” in a neutral essence, but within a paradigm scientists aim for objective understanding.

Despite debates, much common ground emerged. Even critics often acknowledged that Kuhn was right to stress the importance of scientific communities, background assumptions, and the historical context of discovery. Kuhn’s characterization of normal science as puzzle-solving, for instance, influenced thinkers who added nuances (some argued normal science is less dogmatic than Kuhn painted it). Philosophers like Karl Popper began conceding that real science, as practiced, is messier than their ideal models. Others integrated Kuhn’s epochal view into new models: for example, Imre Lakatos retained the idea of “large-scale research programs” that can incorporate anomalies without abandoning core ideas, which moderated Kuhn’s binary normal/revolution split.

Finally, historians pointed out omissions: The paradigm concept did not clearly identify what counted as the unit of scientific change. Ian Hacking and others noted that Kuhn sometimes conflated individual theories, methodological rules, and general views. There were questions about how a revolutionary new paradigm is chosen when multiple contenders exist (for example, dozens of ways to reformulate chemistry in the 18th century). Kuhn’s account provided broad outlines but not a precise “algorithm” for paradigm change, and some critics took issue with that predictive gap.

Legacy

Thomas Kuhn’s legacy is multifaceted. In history and philosophy of science, he is widely regarded as having launched a new phase of study. By showing historians that great thinkers often work within traditions and that science is a social activity, he broadened the discipline. Even critics say Kuhn taught scholars to pay attention to actual scientific practice and to historicize scientific ideas—shifting focus from abstract logic to context and development.

The terms paradigm, normal science, revolution, and incommensurability remain part of the scholarly vocabulary. Kuhn’s model of science is commonly taught in undergraduate science and humanities courses. The general notion of paradigm shifts has spread beyond philosophy of science into business strategy, public policy, and popular discussions about change.

Kuhn also influenced debates about science and society. For example, feminist historians of science noted that Kuhn’s emphasis on social factors opened the door to discussing how gender or culture influence science. Policy analysts have cited Kuhn in thinking about how scientific committees reach consensus. In popular culture, people talk about being “in a period of normal science” or needing a “revolutionary idea” when discussing innovation.

After his death (June 17, 1996, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, from cancer), Kuhn’s work continued to be revisited. The 50th anniversary of Structure in 2012 saw reprints with new introductions (for instance by philosopher Ian Hacking) and renewed interest in assessing Kuhn’s impact. Some modern scholars revisit Kuhn to argue that his model, while incomplete, captured something crucial about paradigm-dependent reasoning that pure logic misses. Others build on Kuhn by studying actual episodes of theory change with finer tools (such as sociological studies of laboratories).

Today there is no consensus that science operates exactly as Kuhn described, but there is broad appreciation for what his framework highlighted. The idea that “solving the last problems” might lead to the next crisis is now commonplace. Scientists themselves sometimes acknowledge that a “mindset” can limit what questions they ask, and working outside the paradigm can be career-risky during normal times.

Finally, Kuhn’s influence outlives his critics in another way: he helped shift the way intellectuals see themselves and knowledge. By portraying science as both personal (based on human choices) and collective (based on community standards), he humanized science. His careful historical studies showed that great scientists like Copernicus or Einstein were revolutionary because they changed how everyone thought, not because they had secret formulae. For many educated readers, Kuhn’s narrative-style writing made philosophy of science engaging, even thrilling. In sum, Kuhn’s legacy is the enduring insight that paradigms—shared world-views—guide how we build knowledge, and that occasionally, entire world-views can change.

Criticisms and Debates

Kuhn’s views have spurred rich debate. Key points include:

Gradual vs. Revolutionary Change: Critics argue science may evolve more continuously than Kuhn suggested. Some say that outstanding discoveries (like X-rays or DNA’s structure) could emerge in normal science rather than as crisis-driven revolutions.

Incommensurability: Many philosophers contest that theories are incommensurable. Realists maintain that successive theories can indeed be compared if they refer to the same world entities. Later semantic philosophy suggests that theoretical terms can keep referring to the same things, so truths can accumulate across paradigms.

Rationality and Relativism: Scholars like Karl Popper and others worried that Kant’s claims would derail objective science. Kuhn insisted science retains objective aims, but debate continues about whether his picture implies any form of relativism. The general view now is that while Kuhn emphasized subjective aspects, most interpreters consider science still fundamentally rational and self-correcting over time.

Sociology vs. Logic of Science: Some questioned whether Kuhn overemphasized social consensus. They argue that crucial theory choices often rely on evidence, not votes. Kuhn and followers replied that consensus itself depends on persuading through evidence framed by the paradigm, so sociology and logic are entwined.

Overall, while few accept Kuhn’s model precisely as originally stated, most acknowledge it pushed science studies forward. The prevailing position is that Kuhn got many descriptive elements right (e.g., science has community-bound phases and interpretations), yet his model may not fit every detail of scientific history.

Legacy

Thomas Kuhn is remembered as a pivotal figure in 20th-century thought. His phrase “paradigm shift” has become ubiquitous, and his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is often listed among the greatest works of intellectual history. As a historian of science, Kuhn showed that understanding the past of science is essential to understanding how science works, influencing both historians and philosophers. He helped pave the way for science studies and for viewing scientific knowledge as a human endeavor shaped by context.

Today Kuhn’s name evokes the moment when science changes course. He remains a standard reference in textbooks on philosophy of science. His life story—from physicist to historian and philosopher—embodies the interdisciplinary approach he championed. Although new models of scientific progress have emerged, and specific challenges to Kuhn’s account persist, his core insight endures: science advances in fits and starts, through revolutionary changes of perspective as well as steady work within an accepted framework. The community of scientists, the language they use, and the world-view they share all matter in whether new ideas take hold. This nuanced view of science owes much to Kuhn’s groundbreaking work, ensuring his lasting importance in the history of science and beyond.

Selected Works

- The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (1957) – A history of how the heliocentric model emerged. - The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962; 2nd ed. 1970) – Kuhn’s landmark book introducing paradigms and scientific revolutions. - The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (1977) – Essays on tradition vs. innovation and related topics. - Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity, 1894–1912 (1978) – A detailed history of early quantum theory research. - The Road Since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993 (2000, eds. J. Conant & J. Haugeland) – Post-1970 essays and reflections on scientific development.

Timeline

1922: Born in Cincinnati, Ohio (July 18).
1943: Graduated Harvard College (A.B. in physics).
1946: M.A. in physics, Harvard University.
1949: Ph.D. from Harvard (initially completed research in physics).
1951: Delivered Lowell Institute Lectures (published later as The Copernican Revolution).
1956: Moved from Harvard to University of California, Berkeley (history of science).
1957: Published The Copernican Revolution.
1962: Published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
1964: Joined Princeton University (history of science department).
1969–70: Published second edition of Structure with Postscript (1969-1970).
1977: The Essential Tension (collection of essays) published.
1979: Moved to Massachusetts Institute of Technology (history of science).
1978: Published Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity.
1990s: Late career work on evolutionary view (published posthumously in The Road Since Structure).
1996: Died in Cambridge, Massachusetts (June 17).

Throughout his career, Kuhn combined historical scholarship with deep reflection on how science operates. His timeline shows a progression from studying specific scientific episodes to formulating a general theory of scientific change—one that continues to influence thought today.