George Edward Moore

George Edward Moore
Region	Western philosophy
Notable ideas	Moore’s paradox; Open-question argument
Known for	Common sense philosophy; Moore’s paradox
Occupation	Philosopher
School	Analytic philosophy
Era	20th-century philosophy
Main interests	Ethics; Epistemology
Also known as	G. E. Moore
Wikidata	Q295386

George Edward Moore (1873–1958), known as G. E. Moore, was a British philosopher instrumental in founding modern analytic philosophy. A Trinity College, Cambridge scholar, he taught alongside Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the early 20th century’s “golden age” of Cambridge philosophy. Moore is celebrated for rigorous argument, clarity of thought, and a firm defense of the commonsense view of the world. His major works include Principia Ethica (1903) on moral philosophy, “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925) in epistemology, and his famous lecture “Proof of an External World” (1939). He introduced key ideas such as the “naturalistic fallacy” in ethics and the so-called Moore’s paradox in philosophy of language. Moore’s influence stretched from ethics to epistemology and beyond; his writing style emphasized analyzing concepts and everyday language rather than building grand systems of philosophy.

Early Life and Education

Moore was born on November 4, 1873, in London, England, into a large family. His father, Daniel Moore, was a music teacher, and George was educated first by his parents and then at Dulwich College, a prestigious London school. He showed early talent in languages, music (especially piano), and classical studies. In 1892 Moore entered Trinity College, Cambridge, where he initially studied Classics (Latin and Greek). Cambridge was then dominated by British Idealism – the view that reality is essentially mental or spiritual – led by figures like F. H. Bradley and his own tutor J. M. E. McTaggart.

Influenced by conversations with mentors and peers (including fellow student Bertrand Russell), Moore added philosophy to his studies. He took a first-class honors degree in Moral Sciences (philosophy) in 1896. In 1898 he won a prestigious Trinity College Prize Fellowship by submitting a philosophical dissertation, a position that allowed him to stay at Cambridge and focus on research. This period (1898–1904) was formative: Moore broke with idealism and began articulating his own views on knowledge, perception, and ethics. After his fellowship ended in 1904, he spent years outside Cambridge, but returned in 1911 as a lecturer in philosophy. In 1921 he became editor of the leading philosophy journal Mind, and in 1925 he was appointed Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge (succeeding James Ward). Moore remained there until retiring in 1939.

Apart from academia, Moore was known for his personal kindness, friendship with literary and artistic figures (he was involved with the Bloomsbury Group around Lytton Strachey and Virginia Woolf), and modesty. He married his former student Dorothy Vicary in 1916 and had two sons. Moore died on October 24, 1958, in Cambridge, leaving a legacy of clear, careful philosophical writing.

Major Works and Ideas

Ethical Philosophy (Principia Ethica and Beyond)

Moore’s most famous contribution to ethics is his 1903 book Principia Ethica. In it he argued that “good” is a simple, non-natural property – meaning that the goodness of something cannot be defined in terms of any natural or scientific quality (such as pleasure, survival, or any observable trait). He introduced the open question argument: for any proposed definition of “good,” one kann still coherently ask, “But is that truly good?” For example, even if someone says “Pleasure is good,” Moore showed that we can meaningfully ask “Is pleasure really good?” – which we can only do if “good” is not identical to “pleasure.” This suggests “good” has a special, indefinable meaning.

From this Moore concluded that valuing or knowing what is good is done by intuition: a kind of direct recognition of value, not a chain of reasoning. He saw this intuition as a legitimate source of knowledge about right and wrong, or about what things are valuable. According to Moore, Principia Ethica identified several examples of intrinsic values (things good in themselves): notably personal love, aesthetic beauty, truth, and the enjoyment of life have real value independent of any other good they lead to. Anything else – actions, desires, or causes – have only instrumental value, useful insofar as they bring about these intrinsic goods.

Moore’s insistence that defining “good” as anything natural is a mistake led him to call the mistake the “naturalistic fallacy.” This is not a logical fallacy in the traditional sense, but Moore’s term for the error of equating the special moral concept good with any natural concept (like pleasure or survival). It became a widely-discussed idea in 20th-century ethics. In practical ethics he favored a form of ideal utilitarianism: one should seek the greatest amount of intrinsic value (not just pleasure) for the greatest number, making moral choices by calculating which actions lead to the best outcomes of value. But he was careful: he believed one can only measure such outcomes to a limited degree by intuition, not by strict calculation.

Moore also wrote Ethics (1912), expanding on his moral theory, and several essays on intrinsic value and judgment. His ethical ideas were hugely influential in English-speaking moral philosophy for decades, especially through their clear distinction between “is” and “ought” and between natural and moral terms. The phrase “naturalistic fallacy” entered common parlance among ethicists as a result.

Epistemology and Common-Sense Realism

In epistemology (theory of knowledge), Moore was a staunch common-sense realist. He believed that everyday beliefs about the world – that there is a material world, that objects like trees and chairs exist, that other people have minds, and so on – are basically true and certain. He rejected extreme skepticism (the idea that we cannot know anything about the world) and rival metaphysical theories like idealism (the view that only minds and ideas exist).

In his 1925 essay “A Defence of Common Sense,” Moore famously listed a series of simple but fundamental truths (“truisms”) that he said we all know with certainty. Examples include statements like “My body has existed on or near the earth during my life,” “I have hands and feet,” and “Humans have always existed.” He asserted that we know such propositions are true. When philosophers questioned these, Moore argued the denials were less plausible than the commonsense assumptions. The aim was not to build an elaborate theory of reality, but simply to show that our basic beliefs are credible. He held that philosophy should start from clear, certain knowledge we all share, rather than doubt it away.

This common-sense approach later influenced Wittgenstein’s work On Certainty. Both philosophers grappled with how to respond to radical doubt on issues so basic that doubt itself seems nonsensical. Moore went so far as to claim that raising his own hands in a public lecture and saying “Here is one hand, and here is another” served as a perfectly rigorous “proof of the external world.” By this he meant he could prove at least some material objects (his hands) exist independent of his mind. He argued that the statement “Here is a hand” is a true premise that everyone shares, and so it proves that at least one material thing exists. Modern commentators see Moore’s proof as more of a clever gesture than a final answer to skepticism, but it powerfully illustrated his confidence in everyday knowledge.

Philosophy of Perception and Sense-Data

Early in his career (around 1898), Moore wrote “The Refutation of Idealism,” an influential paper. In it he addressed British idealism, which held that the kinds of relations between ideas make physical objects unreal. Moore argued against the idea that things we perceive (like the table in front of us) are just patterns in our own experience. He insisted that objects (like his coffee cup) really exist and that perception gives us knowledge of them. Moore contributed to debates over sense-data – the question of whether we perceive external objects directly or only through immediate sensory inputs. He defended a version of direct realism, the view that we are directly aware of external objects, although later philosophers refined these issues after him.

Moore’s realism also appeared in his careful analysis of what it means to say something exists. In another essay, “Is Existence a Predicate?” he famously argued against a version of the idea that “to exist” is like a property an object can have; instead he used ordinary language logic (borrowing Kant’s phrasing) to show that existence is not a property in the same way as color or shape, but simply the affirmation that an object of some description is present.

Moore’s Paradox and Language

Moore’s investigations into logic and language include what is now known as Moore’s paradox. He first noted this paradoxical phenomenon – though without a catchy name – early in the 20th century. The paradox is a matter of content versus assertion. For example, consider the sentence: “It is raining, but I don’t believe that it is raining.” This sentence can be literally true (maybe it is raining, and somehow the speaker is wrong), and it is not a formal logical contradiction. Yet it is strange or absurd to assert it about oneself. Why? On one hand, each part of the sentence (“It is raining” and “I do not believe that it is raining”) could be true in isolation. On the other hand, to say them together is odd. Moore pointed out that asserting such a sentence seems to violate a pragmatic norm of conversation: if it’s raining, the speaker ought to believe it, or shouldn’t say they do not. Ludwig Wittgenstein later called this “Moore’s paradox” and studied it in depth. It remains a topic in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind as a puzzle: why is the combination absurd to say, even though it could, in principle, be true? Moore himself did not solve the paradox rigorously, but he highlighted it as an important linguistic anomaly.

Beyond this, Moore also worked on logical form and analysis of language. His general approach was to break down statements into clear components and test them. He encouraged asking whether a statement conflicts with common sense or is internally consistent. In doing so, he moved philosophy toward the analytic method of examining language and meaning that became dominant later.

Method

Moore did not build grand philosophical systems. In his own words, he had no innate “philosophical method” beyond tackling particular questions that intrigued or troubled him. He often said that he began philosophizing only because some claim (often by other philosophers) disagreed with his common-sense beliefs. Thus, his approach was piecemeal and highly focused.

Nonetheless, Moore’s style became very influential. He insisted on precise analysis of concepts and propositions. When posed with a question, Moore would clarify exactly what terms like “knowledge,” “belief,” “good,” or “existence” mean in a given context. This often involved distinguishing subtle differences: for example, separating what a judgment is (a mental act) from what makes it true (a fact in the world). He was famous for saying something is either known for certain or not, and he would ask whether a statement violated what “ordinary language” or “common sense” implies. Some later philosophers took this to mean that Moore’s method was just defending ordinary speech against technical usage; in fact, Moore was clear that he was interested in concepts and truths, not merely grammar.

Key to his method was argument by counterexample and clarity. For instance, to criticize idealism, he would show a simple case (“Here is my hand”) and argue that it clearly gives knowledge of something external. To analyze “good” in ethics, he examined purported definitions and showed how asking the open question revealed a missing element. He championed logical rigor: if an argument’s premises are true and clearly understood, the conclusion must follow. When claims undermined basic beliefs, Moore often held the burden of proof lay on their supporters.

In short, Moore’s method was to tackle isolated problems, analyze the language and assumptions involved, and appeal to clear, obvious truths. This commitment to clarity and reasoned argument – often referred to as analytic philosophy – was one of Moore’s major legacies. It set the tone for much British and American philosophy throughout the 20th century.

Influence

Moore had a wide influence both within and beyond academia. In philosophical circles, he helped establish the analytic tradition. By breaking from British Idealism, Moore (along with Russell) showed a new way to do philosophy with logic and careful analysis. Many later philosophers, including J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and Elizabeth Anscombe, were inspired by Moore’s emphasis on ordinary language and clarity. Wittgenstein, though often critical of Moore’s pictures, credited Moore’s ideas about certainty in his development of On Certainty. The concept of the naturalistic fallacy and the open question argument shaped mid-20th-century ethics discussions; moral philosophers such as W. D. Ross and R. M. Hare engaged with Moore’s theory of intrinsic values and intuition.

Moore also influenced those outside strict philosophy. In Cambridge, he was a beloved mentor and friend. He counted among his acquaintances many key cultural figures. Moore was a member of the Ack of Trinity’s schools and the secret society called the Cambridge Apostles, as were members of the Bloomsbury Group (writers and artists like Virginia Woolf’s husband Leonard Woolf, economist John Maynard Keynes, and writers Lytton Strachey and E. M. Forster). Though Moore himself was a scholarly recluse, his belief in the importance of love, friendship, and artistic beauty resonated with these intellectuals. Lambasting bureaucracy and defending personal bonds, Moore left an indirect imprint on literature and social thought of the time.

As editor of Mind (1921–1947), Moore shaped the philosophical conversation by choosing what papers to publish, and by setting a standard of precision. Colleagues remembered him as both friendly and uncompromising: Gilbert Ryle wrote that Moore treated “mistakes and muddles” in reasoning with “genial ferocity,” encouraging clear thinking among students. Figures like Cardinal John Henry Newman (through Russell’s writings), Wittgenstein, and later ordinary-language philosophers traced aspects of their approach to Moore’s insistence on clarity and on respecting ordinary beliefs.

After his retirement and death, the direct school of “intuitionist” ethics (of which he was a founder) waned – as many philosophers moved to other views like emotivism or naturalistic ethics. Still, many of Moore’s ideas remain staples in philosophy education. Terms like “naturalistic fallacy” and “intuitionism” in ethics trace back to him, and courses on knowledge and language often cover Moore’s paradox. In sum, Moore’s blend of common-sense realism, ethical non-naturalism, and analytic rigor left a lasting mark on 20th-century thought.

Critiques

Although widely respected, Moore’s views have attracted criticism. In ethics, critics questioned his intuitionism. Some argued that claiming “good” is indefinable accepts too much ambiguity – if we can’t define good, how do we know what actions to take? Others pointed out that Moore’s “proof” that certain values are simply self-evident feels circular. The terminology of “naturalistic fallacy” has also been debated: later ethicists like William Frankena called it the “definist fallacy” instead, arguing that Moore simply noted a kind of definitional confusion, not a special moral error. Utilitarian philosophers (who identify good with happiness) alsoprobably rejected Moore’s arguments, whereas others like Philippa Foot and Elizabeth Anscombe pointed out ways to ground morality that Moore seemed to deny. In short, some think he dismantled whole approaches to ethics without offering a clear alternative beyond “intuition,” leaving moral theory without a systematic basis.

Moore’s defence of common sense met skepticism of a different sort. Philosophers like David Hume had long argued that common belief is not always a reliable guide to truth. Voltaire famously quipped that “common sense is not so common.” Critics say Moore’s strategy of listing obvious truths does not answer philosophical doubts; rather, it sidesteps them. For example, even if it seems impossible to doubt one’s hands exist, some philosophers (skeptics) argue you could be dreaming or deceived, so the question is not completely settled. In response, Moore insisted such doubts were frivolous. To some, this felt like a too-dogmatic stance. Analytical philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein later emphasized that while doubt might be conceptually possible, our language and meaning give foundational beliefs a special status. But whether Moore’s approach really solves skepticism remains controversial.

Moore’s philosophical method itself was also critiqued. Some accused him of never tackling the “big questions” or failing to develop a coherent metaphysical view. Philosopher V. J. H. McGill pointed out that Moore never formulated a complete system, leaving gaps on many issues. Moore replied he simply wasn’t interested in those questions. Additionally, a generation of analytic philosophers misunderstood Moore as denying all meaning outside ordinary language. Norman Malcolm, a philosopher student of Wittgenstein, famously said Moore believed “any philosophical statement that violates ordinary language is false,” but this was an oversimplification. In reality, Moore insisted he analyzed concepts, not words; but his style led many to think of him as an early “ordinary language” philosopher.

Even Moore’s paradox is still debated. Many modern accounts call it not a logical contradiction but a pragmatic oddity: why one cannot coherently believe or assert the sentence about a fact one disbelieves. Some see it as a failure of the speaker’s sincerity, others as revealing tensions between belief and assertion rules. But no single explanation is universally accepted. The ongoing discussion of Moore’s paradox shows that, while Moore identified the puzzle, he may not have fully resolved it.

Overall, critiques of Moore revolve around: his reliance on intuition (seen by some as arbitrary); his shifting of argumentative burden (telling skeptics to prove their doubts, rather than defending all knowledge); and his gaps (ignoring many philosophical problems). Still, even critics usually acknowledge Moore’s skill in exposing subtle confusions, even if they disagree with his conclusions.

Legacy

George E. Moore is remembered as a giant in early analytic philosophy whose work still resonates today. Many of his phrases and ideas have entered philosophical vocabulary. For example, it is now common to call erroneous attempts to define good “the naturalistic fallacy,” and to describe questions that remain open after a definition attempt as “open questions.” Moore’s sharp distinction between moral and non-moral properties shaped how later advocates of moral realism and intuitionism talked about ethics (even authors who disagreed used his language to frame their arguments).

In epistemology, the ongoing conversation about the role of common beliefs and skepticism often circles back to Moore’s insistence that everyday knowledge claims are certain barring overwhelming reason to doubt. Wittgenstein’s On Certainty repeatedly echoes Moore’s idea that doubting fundamental propositions leads to a “hinges” problem (foundation issues) – and many modern epistemologists credit Moore with raising those doubts. Moore’s example proof of 1939 (holding up hands) is still widely taught as a simple illustration of pushing back against radical doubt.

In philosophical method, Moore’s legacy is his championing of clarity, analysis, and attention to ordinary meaning. He essentially gave permission to later philosophers to be stubbornly transparent: if something is true, just say it plainly and defend it. This ethos runs through analytic philosophy, especially in the English-speaking world.

Outside philosophy, Moore’s character and ideas inspired many intellectuals of his time. Members of the Bloomsbury Group considered him a model of integrity and honesty. His belief that love and beauty are intrinsically valuable appealed to artists and writers. Even economists like Keynes were influenced indirectly by Moore’s social trust – Keynes wrote of Moore with respect in personal writings.

Overall, the legacy of G. E. Moore is one of unwavering insistence on the obvious and the true. He helped philosophy move towards methods we still use: careful argument, conceptual analysis, and an attitude that philosophy should not seem remote from ordinary life. His works continue to be widely studied. Ethics textbooks reference his open question argument, philosophy of knowledge courses discuss his proof of an external world, and courses on language and mind analyze Moore’s paradox. In 1951 he was awarded the Order of Merit, and today he is regarded as one of the most important British philosophers of the 20th century.

Selected Works

“The Refutation of Idealism” (1899) – Essay critiquing British idealism, showing some objects must be independent of minds.
Principia Ethica (1903) – Landmark book in ethics; introduces the open question argument and calls “good” a simple, indefinable quality.
Ethics (1912) – Book developing his ethical theory (ideal utilitarianism) and intrinsic value concept.
“The Conception of Intrinsic Value” (1922) – Essay refining what it means for something to have value in itself.
“A Defence of Common Sense” (1925) – Essay listing basic truths he claimed all know, as a rebuttal to philosophical skepticism.
Some Main Problems of Philosophy (1912) – Collection of lectures, including topics on knowledge and common sense.
“Proof of an External World” (1939) – Famous lecture asserting the obvious proof (holding up hands) that at least some material objects exist.
“Some Remarks on Logical Form” (1938) – Essay clarifying how language expresses thought; important in logic and philosophy of language.
Philosophical Papers (1959) – Posthumous collection of Moore’s essays on ethics, language, and perception, edited by Paul Grice and John Warnock.

Timeline

1873 – Born in London (Nov. 4).
1892 – Enters Trinity College, Cambridge, initially for Classics.
1896 – Graduates from Cambridge with first-class honors in Classics and Moral Science (philosophy).
1898 – Wins Trinity College Prize Fellowship at Cambridge.
1899 – Publishes “The Refutation of Idealism”.
1903 – Publishes Principia Ethica.
1912 – Publishes Ethics and Some Main Problems of Philosophy.
1921 – Becomes editor of Mind (until 1947).
1922 – “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” appears in his Ethics.
1925 – Gives “A Defence of Common Sense”; retires from lecturing to become full Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge.
1939 – Retires from professorship; delivers “Proof of an External World” (British Academy Lecture).
1940–44 – Serves as visiting professor in the United States (Columbia, Harvard, etc.).
1944 – Retires as editor of Mind.
1951 – Awarded the Order of Merit; publishes “Some Remarks on Logical Form.”
1958 – Dies in Cambridge (Oct. 24). ოქ